AN ANALYSIS OF EQUILIBRIUM RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRICE ELASTICITY AND EXPENDITURE LEVEL: A CASE STUDY OF KOREAN MOBILE MARKET DATA by Hongjai Rhee & Sangkyu Rhee
JOURNAL  OF  ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT                              69 
Volume 34, Number 2, December 2009 
 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF EQUILIBRIUM RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRICE 
ELASTICITY AND EXPENDITURE LEVEL: 
A CASE STUDY OF KOREAN MOBILE MARKET DATA 
 
* HONGJAI RHEE AND SANGKYU RHEE
 
Ajou University and Chung-Ang University 
 
 
In most developing countries, telecommunications industry has been grown fast and still 
has more growth potential than in the developed countries. Clearly the telecommunications 
industry contributes to foster economic developments and also to narrow the communication 
gaps among countries. Among many components relating to the success of quick 
developments of telecommunication services, an appropriate and optimal pricing strategies 
is the most vital element. In this view point, this paper examines the optimal price 
discrimination strategy for firms in a monopolistically competitive market. The primary 
interest is the theoretical relationship between price elasticity and the average expenditure 
level of consumers. Our equilibrium analysis shows that the relationship can go either way 
(positive or negative) depending on the prevailing price level of the product in concern. As 
an empirical example, using a hierarchical Bayes model we find that heavy user of mobile 
service are substantially more elastic to the price of calls in Korea. A discussion of the 
optimal pricing scheme and market structure is in order. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In most developing countries, telecommunications industry has been grown fast and 
still has more growth potential than in the developed countries. Since the 
telecommunication services are essential input for all the industries, it is clear that the 
telecommunications industry contributes to foster economic developments and also to 
narrow the communication gaps between countries. Among many components relating 
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to the success of quick developments of telecommunication services, an appropriate 
pricing policy is the most vital element. Therefore it will be helpful to learn some 
lessons from the successful countries in telecommunication sector such as Korea which 
we explore in this paper. Specifically, we note that price discrimination such as in the 
form of various tariff options is important to lessen the payment of consumers as well as 
to increase telecommunication operators’ profit margin. 
In this view point, this paper examines the optimal price discrimination strategy for 
firms in a monopolistically competitive market. The primary interest is the theoretical 
relationship between price elasticity and the average expenditure level of consumers. In 
theory, monopoly and perfect competition comprise two typical market structures. In 
reality, however, most markets fall in between the two extremes. Most products in a 
market have some degree of product differentials in the supply side as well as some 
degree of consequential switching costs in the demand side. Nevertheless, the existing 
marketing practices and researches have not fully utilized this structural viewpoint. The 
existing marketing literature has shown a great interest in the cross-segment difference 
in price sensitivity of customers when choosing a brand or an outlet (e.g., Hoch et al. 
(1995), Bolton (1989), Kumar and Leone (1988), Allenby and Lenk (1995)) while 
paying much less attention on the fundamental quantity decision of how much to buy at 
a given price.
1 In contrast, the pricing strategy in economics literatures is mostly about 
price elasticity in a fairly monopolistic environment. In this environment, economics 
theory predicts it profitable to have the mark-up (over marginal cost) in a market 
segment as reverse-proportional to the price elasticity of the consumers in the segment. 
Thus, from a managerial perspective, it is important to apprehend who is more or less 
price elastic. In sum, there exists an obvious disparity of concern in economics and 
marketing literature. For instance, Hoch et al. (1995) stated that “a simple strategy for 
reducing promotion cost would be to have smaller price cuts in the highly sensitive 
stores coupled with larger cuts in the insensitive stores.” On appearance, this suggestion 
seems contradicting the inverse elasticity rule if we adopt the usual terminological 
interchange of price ‘elasticity’ and price ‘sensitivity’. As mentioned, while the primary 
objective in marketing literature is to use the cross-segment heterogeneity in price 
sensitivity to maximize the choice share of a brand in a highly competitive environment, 
the economic theory of inverse elasticity rule is mostly relevant for firms with a 
monopoly power in customers’ choice of the quantity of their products. 
Having this in mind, one should be careful to apply the findings drawn from a 
competitive environment to a monopolistic environment, and vice versa. For example, 
the expenditure level (or ‘basket size’) and the purchasing frequency of consumers are 
found the most significant behavioral factors for underlying differences in price 
sensitivity of customers (e.g., Ainslie and Rossi (1998), Bell and Lattin (1998), 
 
1 A striking example is Chiang (1991) in which the decisions of whether, what and how much to buy are 
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Manchanda, Ansari and Gupta (1998), Kim and Rossi (1994)). This suggests that some 
preference parameters are well picked up by those shopping style variables. However, 
the effect (not only in magnitude but even in direction) of expenditure level or 
purchasing frequency can be quite different if we rather focus on the quantity decision 
and so the price elasticity of customers. 
This concern in particular as well as the widespread practice of volume-based price 
discounts drove us to test if there is a systematic relationship between price elasticity 
and the average expenditure level of consumers. Instead of directly testing it with an 
empirical data, we first question whether the relationship has a theoretical support. To 
preview, we verify under some technical conditions that the cross-segment difference in 
expenditure can explain the difference in price elasticity so that an optimal 
expenditure-based price discrimination strategy is possible. More importantly to our 
empirical interest, we find the equilibrium relationship between price elasticity and 
expenditure level is not deterministic a priori. Rather, the relationship goes either way, 
positive or negative, depending on the prevailing price level of a focal product and the 
marginal utility of the outside alternatives. Therefore the relationship can be country- 
and/or product-specific, and a case-specific empirical investigation is necessary. As an 
empirical example, we demonstrate that the relationship is strongly positive (i.e., heavy 
users are more price-elastic) for a sample data of Korean mobile telecommunication 
service market.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 derives the demand function 
for a product. An analysis shows that a theoretical but indeterminate cross-sectional 
relationship exists between the expenditure and price elasticity. Chapter 3 estimates a 
case relationship using a panel data for mobile telecommunications service in Korea. 
Chapter 4 discusses a managerial implication and a possible integration of price 
sensitivity and elasticity research in the future. Chapter 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2.  AN  EQUILIBRIUM  ANALYSIS 
 
This section introduces a model to analyze the behavior of consumers and a firm. 
The model is based on Tirole (1988) with a modification to our objective to establish a 
theoretical link between the price elasticity and the size of demand. 
 
2.1.  Model 
 
Let   be the individual i’s quantity demanded for the product (or service) of 
concern. Let p be the price for unit of consumption, r the fixed access charge to the 
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where   denotes individual i’s income, and   denotes the expenditure on 
. It is assumed that   
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If   is much smaller than   (i.e., the expenditure on this particular good is 
small relative to income),
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2 then the preference on ( ) can be approximated as 
follows:
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3   represents inverse of the marginal utility of income.   where  Tirole (1988) 
attributed the heterogeneity of consumers only to their different income levels (i.e., 
difference in  ) assuming no difference in the functional form of    in (3). In fact, 
this is equivalent to assuming that all individuals have the same preference to the 
product. More generally in this paper, we extend the model to allow consumers different 
not only in    but also in their preference to the service such that 
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This functional form is very popular in macroeconomic analysis (e.g., Blanchard and 
Fisher (1989)) and is also adopted by Laffont et al. (1998) to discuss the consequence of 
price discrimination in network industry. For   and  , we should restrict the 
range of    to (0,1). In sum, consumer i is now represented by the pair of parameters, 
0 '> i V 0 "< i V
i σ
 
2 In this article, we analyze Korean mobile telecommunication service. Thus   represents monthly 
expenditure on mobile service. In 2007, the ratio of total expenditure on telecom services (fixed line services, 
broadband internet service, mobile services, value-added services) to household-income is 4.18%. Since the 
ratio of expenditure on mobile services to household-income is lower than 4.18%, we can say that this 
condition holds.   
i T
  3 A first-order Taylor expansion of Equation (1) with respect to variable   around   yields Equation 
(3): 
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( ). For brevity of exposition, we further employ a discrete type of customers in 
each parameter such that 
i i σ θ ,
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where   and   Then the consumers are classified into four 
distinct types (or segments): 
H L θ θ < < 0 . 1 0 < < < H L σ σ
} , , , { IV III II I i∈ ,  where  ,  , 
 and  .   
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σ One advantage of the above specification is that the parameter   is related to the 
price elasticity as one-to-one basis. To see this, we derive the optimal level of 
consumption    for the given price of   as 
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So,   amounts to the constant price elasticity so that the consumer with higher 
 turns  out  less price elastic. 
i σ / 1
i σ
 
2.2.  Price  Discrimination  Strategy 
 
As mentioned before, our main question is whether there exists a systematic 
cross-segment link between the price elasticity ( ) and the quantity demanded ( ). 
Obviously, Equation (7) tells that the relationship hinges on the marginal utility of 
income    and the prevailing price (p).  
*
i q i σ / 1
() i θ
Figure 1 displays typical demand schedule of each consumer segment according to 
Equation (7). In order to price discriminate, a firm should be able to separate consumer 
segments with different price elasticities on the observable ground. The following 
proposition makes it possible to use the average size of the demand (or expenditure 
level) as a proxy for the price elasticity but only in some circumstances: 
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Figure 1.    Illustration of Demand Functions for Each Segment 
 
 
Proposition 1.  Regardless  of  , the high-demand segments are more price elastic 






































=   No systematic relationship holds otherwise. 
k p Proof.    The threshold price level ( ) in Figure 1 can be obtained by the pair-wise 
equality of the type-specific demands such that   
 












































The claimed relationship between price elasticity   and the size of demand is 
evident from Figure 1.  ■ 
 
If this is the case, what will be the best price discrimination strategy from firm’s 
perspective? Clearly, it will depend on the current price level utilizing Proposition 1 
such as follows. 
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Corollary 1.  It pays to increase firms’ profit to discriminate price in favor of 
high-demand segments (i.e., heavy users) if the current price level is below  1 p , or in 
favor of low-demand segments if the current price is above  4 p . 
Proof.    To maximize profit, the firm must apply the inverse elasticity rule such that 
the price is set reverse-proportional to the price elasticity of each segment. More 
















* * * *   where    denote the optimal price for 
segment   and   the marginal cost.
*
j p
4 c } , , , { IV III II I j∈  Due to the relationship between 
price elasticity and the size of demand as in Proposition 1, the corollary holds.  ■ 
 
Summing up, the bottom line prediction is that the quantity-oriented price 
discrimination is relevant only in certain circumstance, and the direction of profitable 
discrimination can go either way depending on the prevailing price level of the focal 
product. In fact, the empirical relationship can vary depending on the competitive 
market environment, product lifecycle
5, and many others that affect the price levels. And 
this calls for a careful investigation before employing an expenditure-based price 
discrimination strategy in practice. 
 
 
3.  EMPIRICAL  FINDINGS 
 
We now proceed to an empirical model to explore a case relationship between price 
elasticity and the average expenditure of consumers. We select the mobile 
telecommunications services in Korea because of data availability and also with a 
concern that the mobile operators in particular require a smart pricing strategy against 
the trend of market saturation and continual pressure on regulatory or competitive tariff 
reduction. In addition, the Korean mobile market makes a good case of the monopolistic 
industry structure at least for the sample period in our dataset. While three firms 
compete with differentiated service and marketing activities, consumers bear a 
substantial churning cost arising from the absence of handset and number portability
6 as 
well as the loss of loyalty benefits such as accumulated mileages.   
It is interesting to note that this empirical relationship in mobile industry was 
 
4 θ  It is note worthy that the type-difference in   (i.e., marginal utility of income) does not matter in the 
optimal price discrimination strategy. It simply drops out of the first-order condition.   
5 If the price level tends to decline over the life cycle of a product, one can also argue that the relationship is 
likely to be positive in the long run.   
6 The mobile number portability has begun only in 2004 after the end of the sample period, and switchers are 
still subject to the handset incompatibility among operators. HONGJAI RHEE AND SANGKYU RHEE  76 
exploited in Jain, Muller and Vilcassim (1999). To explain why the mobile tariff level in 
U.S. is stable in contrast to the rapid downturn of the handset price in the late nineties, 
they postulated that mobile consumers consist of high- and low-usage segments in which 
the higher-use segment is more sensitive to the price of phone calls. This assumption 
was backed up by a conjoint analysis to a focused group of consumers. Obviously, we do 
not attempt to challenge or validate this finding. Nonetheless, we believe that our 
empirical study using an actual panel consumption data could provide a better support to 
their proposition too if found consistent. 
 
3.1.  Specification 
 
We begin with the demand function derived in Equation (7):   
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Using the logarithm in Equation (7) and comparing with Equation (8),   denotes 
individual difference in preference (or in income), and   denotes the negative price 
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The error term   is assumed to follow an independent normal distribution 
N( ). To allow consumer heterogeneity in elasticity in most flexible way (e.g., 
Allenby and Rossi (1999)), we use a hierarchical random effect Bayes model which is 
popularly utilized in recent marketing literature such as in Rossi, MuCulloch and 
Allenby (1996) among many others. That is, we assume   
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where   denotes  i X K × 1  vector of K demographic covariates of consumer i  
including intercept,  δ 2 × K   parameter matrix of the marginal impact of demographics 
in    to the mean of heterogeneity in either in  i X α  (the  1
st nd  row) or in  β  (the  2  row), 
and   denotes    variance-covariance matrix of ( ), respectively.  i i β α , 2 2× Σ
 
3.2.  Data 
 
We use a monthly panel data of 2298 sample customers of a mobile operator in 
Korea. The Korean mobile telecommunication service market has rapidly grown to AN ANALYSIS OF EQUILIBRIUM RELATIONSHIP  77 
about 47 million subscribers as of June 2009 comprising almost 95% of total population. 
The panel data records the amount of voice calls (in billing unit of 10 seconds) for 21 
months from August 2000 to April 2002, and demographic information on sex and age 
of the panelists. It is important to note that each panelist in the data uses the same tariff 
plan (namely the standard tariff). Therefore, we worry little about a possible 




Figure 2.    The Average Change of Mobile Price and Demand (in log scale) 
 
 
To construct a price measure (per 10 second voice calls), we computed a real price 
index for each month using the available nominal prices
7 and the consumer price index 
(CPI). Figure 2 displays the month-to-month variation of the real price index (in log 
scale). In short, we note that the price gradually decreases over the sample period except 
a prominent break in the month #18 (Jan 2000). Because every consumers use the same 
standard tariff plan during the entire sample period, it should be noted that the individual 
price measure ( ) in Equation (8) becomes identical across every sample consumer in 
our data such as  . 
it p
t it p p =
For the demand variable ( ), we take the log units of voice calls (in 10 seconds) 
made by each panelist for each month. Meanwhile, as clear in the average demand 
profile in Figure 2, an apparent seasonal variation was noticed in the data particularly in 
it q
 
7 In fact, the operator provides different rates for day time, night time, and weekends. With a known 
distribution of calls, we computed a weighted average of the rates. HONGJAI RHEE AND SANGKYU RHEE  78 
February (with fewer days) and the months with big holidays (January and August by 
lunar calendar). Therefore, we adjusted the quantity variables by the exact number of 
working days in a month (with 30-day standard).
8 The other key variable is the average 
quantity demanded (denoted as i y ) of each panelist during the sample period. We 
constructed this variable by taking the sample average of the number of voice calls for 
















Figure 3.    The Histogram of Average Log Demand per Month Across Panelists 
 
 
In sum, the demographic covariates   in Equation (10) includes four variables 
including intercept, log(
i X
i y ),   if male, and log( ) in turn. Of course, the 
other covariates such as individual income level may play a key role in determining 
price sensitivity of mobile consumers. Due to data limitation, we could not sufficiently 
control for possible omitted variable biases. Technically, we subtracted the means from 
each non-intercept variables to have the intercept parameter interpreted as ( ) of the 
average panelist in the sample.
1 = i sex i age
i i β α ,
9 Of primary concern is the regression coefficient 




8 This adjustment turned out to increase the magnitude of price elasticity a little bit. However, we verified 
that our main finding is qualitatively intact. 
9 The mean subtraction procedure was suggested in Rossi, Allenby and MuCulloch (2005).AN ANALYSIS OF EQUILIBRIUM RELATIONSHIP  79 
3.3.  Estimation 
 
The likelihood function for Equation (8) contains many individual parameters 
( ). Furthermore, the individual parameters are possibly correlated with each other 
by the random effect specification in Equation (10). Our objective is to estimate the 
predictive distributions of the hyper parameters in Equation (10), 
i i β α ,
δ  and  , as well as 
the individual parameters of 2,298 sample consumers in our data. Therefore, the joint 
likelihood seems hard to evaluate analytically. To sidestep this difficulty, we use a 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method which becomes popular in the recent 
marketing literature (e.g., Rossi, Allenby and McCulloch (2005)).   
Σ
To implement a Bayesian hierarchical model, it is necessary to specify a prior 
distribution of the hyper parameters in the bottom of the hierarchy, i.e.,    ,
2 χ δ  and  . 
As usual, we employ quite diffuse but proper priors for the hyper parameters to make the 
impact of prior as small as possible. Specifically, we used R program language, and 
worked with the ‘hierarchical Bayes model’ included in the ‘bayesm’ package developed 
by Rossi, Allenby and McCulloch (2005). In what follows, all results summarize 1000 
posterior draws of each parameter with 1000 burn-ins and 5 thinning interval of 
sequences. To diagnose the convergence of the sampler, we verified the posterior 




3.4.  Result  
 
Table 1 summarizes the estimated posterior distribution of parameters (means and 
standard deviations in parenthesis). The average of constant elasticity demand function 
was estimated to have the intercept of 10.91 and the slope (price elasticity) of -1.20 with 
strong significance. For demographic effects, the sex and age do not give significant 
effects on the demand parameters. In contrast, the average log expenditure of panelists 
turned out to increase the demand intercept (3.36) and to make the price elasticity even 
more negative (-0.792). The latter finding per se clearly tells about our primary concern 
such that the heavy mobile users are more likely to have high price elasticity. The 
unobserved heterogeneity in individual demand parameters is profound as can be seen 
from the estimates of  , and this is probably due to poor performance of the 
demographic covariates except the log expenditure. 
Σ
Focusing on the key parameters of interest, Figure 4 displays the posterior kernel 
densities of the average price elasticity (left panel), and of the effect of log expenditure 
on the price elasticity (right panel). Because the priors are selected as conditional 
conjugate to the likelihood, both posterior densities look very similar to the normal 
curvature. 
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Table 1.    Mean and Standard Deviation of Posterior Distribution of Parameters 







Intercept ( )  i α
10.908
** 3.367
** 0.271  -0.345 
(0.25)  (0.47)  (0.58)  (1.46) 
Demand 
Slope ( )  i β
-1.198
** -0.792
** -0.089  0.125 
(0.16)  (0.08)  (0.19)  (0.49) 
1 , 1 Σ = SD( ) i α   10.060
** (0.22) 
2 , 2 Σ = SD( ) i β   3.362
** (0.07) 
Cov( , )   i α i β 2 , 1 Σ = -33.83
** (1.50) 
2 χ = SD( ) i ε   0.091
** (0.03) 




Finally, it is noteworthy that our empirical finding is in line with the conjoint 
analysis of Jain, Muller and Vilcassim (1999) for U.S. mobile services. However, as our 
model predicts that the relationship can go either way depending on the prevailing price 
of the product in a country, this analogy may be a coincidence. 
 







Mean=  -1.19,  S.D.=0.08







Effect of Expenditure 
Mean=  -0.79,  S.D.=0.16   
Figure 4.    The Posterior Kernel Density of Key Parameters 
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4.  DISCUSSION 
 
So far, we proposed that the theoretical relationship between price elasticity and 
expenditure level can go positive, neutral or negative depending on the characteristics of 
the focal product, and then demonstrated a positive case with an example data for 
Korean mobile telecommunication service market. Let alone our two way theoretical 
predictions, the empirical finding can help to boost the profit of mobile operators in 
devising a consistent price differentiation or segmentation strategy. However, it is also 
noteworthy that the empirical finding seems in contrast to those in the previous shopping 
behavior literature in marketing. For example, Bell and Lattin (1998) showed that 
large-basket shoppers tend to be less ‘sensitive’ to a category-level price promotion 
when choosing retailers. However, one should remind the disparity of concerns in price 
elasticity and sensitivity literature as was highlighted before. While the marketing 
literature focuses mostly on the choice of a supplier in highly competitive environment, 
our elasticity study in this paper is more valid for the choice of quantity for a given 
supplier in a monopolistic environment with substantial product differentiation and 
switching cost.   
One may argue that the inverse elasticity rule we explored in this paper only works 
for a pure monopoly case. On the other hand, we contend that the empirical scope of 
monopolistic price strategy goes beyond it. In reality, there is no distinctive borderline 
between monopoly and competition. To avoid unsustainable price competition, most 
products in a market are differentiated in a variety of dimensions such as brand, quality, 
distribution channel and many others. In addition, consumers bear a substantial 
switching cost (both in economic and psychological sense) which hinders them from 
churning for a small price gap among alternatives. Therefore, we believe our analysis in 
this paper can be applied to a broad range of monopolistically competitive markets in the 
field. More generally, though it seems quite interesting to extend our analysis to more 
competitive environment through a simultaneous parameterization of the switching cost 
and price elasticity, this is left a fruitful research track to proceed.   
 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
Knowing the cross-segment heterogeneity in price elasticity of consumers makes it 
profitable to devise a relevant price discrimination strategy for a firm in a monopolistic 
market. The bottom line suggestion is to give relatively deeper discounts to the 
consumers of higher price elasticity. Despite the simplicity of this guideline, the price 
elasticity of demand has not been fully utilized in the previous marketing literature as 
compared to substantial emphases on the price sensitivity in choosing a brand or a store. 
Probably, this is mostly because the literature has postulated substantially competitive 
business environment. In this paper, we alternatively contended that the empirical 
relevance of the inverse elasticity rule goes beyond the pure monopoly case. If with HONGJAI RHEE AND SANGKYU RHEE  82 
substantial product differentiation and/or switching costs in the market, firms would 
price discriminate across segments based on a reliable proxy of the price elasticity. 
Unlike the conventional pricing practice in favor of heavy users, our theoretical model 
predicts that expenditure and price elasticity can be correlated to either direction 
depending on the prevailing price level of the focal product. Therefore, a careful 
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